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Introduction

In 1890 the United States Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act, which, in section 2, prohibits monopolization. 1 In 1957
Western European nations ratified the Treaty of Rome, which, in
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
This article is based on a chapter entitled "Abuse of a Dominant Position Under the
Treaty of Rome-A Comparison With U.S. Law," in ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICIES OF THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, 1983 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. (B. Hawk ed. 1984).
Copyright 1984 by Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. The portions reprinted here are reprinted here with permission of Matthew Bender & Co.
The author is deeply indebted to Valentine Korah, John Temple Lang, Janusz
Ordover, and Bastiaan van der Esch, all of whom made most helpful comments on a prior
draft.
1 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
*

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:981

article 86, prohibits abuse of a dominant position. 2
The two systems have common objectives. They both seek to
advance the interests of consumers and to protect the free flow of
goods in a competitive economy. Both seek to protect access of
competitors to unfettered markets, freedom of choice, and freedom
from coercion. 3 Each, however, has its special history and focus.
The Common Market evolved from the perceived need to
break down trade barriers between Western European nations and
thereby to form one "common market." Accordingly, community
law stresses as its cardinal principle the free movement of goods
and people across Member State lines. 4 Moreover, community law
evolved from a tradition of hospitality to industrial concentration
combined with receptivity to government regulation that would
limit the exercise of power. 5
United States antitrust law evolved from a tradition of inhospitality to concentration and a strong preference for competition over
government regulation of performance. 6 In recent years, judicial
decisionmaking has become increasingly sensitive to consumers' interests, to the economic strength of U.S. firms in world markets,
and to claims that antitrust enforcement has undermined both. Accordingly, contemporary U.S. decisions back away from the more
intrusive antitrust surveillance of the 1960s and tend to defer to
business discretion of even large firms.
In this article I examine the major European Court of Justice
judgments regarding abuse of a dominant position,7 and the EC
Commission proceeding against IBM. I compare the analysis and
outcomes with U.S. law. 8 Finally, I suggest some lessons that each
system of law might hold for the other. In searching for lessons, I
consider recent efforts within the United States to collapse all of
antitrust into a single outcome-oriented efficiency rule. 9 As I ana2 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, art. 86,
298 U.N.T.S. 11, 48 [hereinafter cited as "Treaty of Rome"].
3 Regarding United States law, see Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981). Regarding Common Market law, see Parts VI and
VII infra. See generally 2 B. HAWK, UNITED STATES COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE chs. 7, 12 (2d ed. 1985).
4 See B. HAWK, supra note 3, ch. 7.
5 See id. at 7-16; Verloren van Themaat, Introduction,Antitrust and the Common Market-A
Symposium, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 435 (1963).
6 See Fox, supra note 3, at 1166-68.
7 First level decisions are taken before the Commission of the European Communities.
The Court of Justice is the appellate court. Opinions of the Court of Justice are called
"judgments."
For a discussion of the case law generally, including decisions of the Commission, see
B. HAWK, supra note 3, ch. 12.
8 In this article I do not deal with market definition issues. I focus, rather, upon the
nature of conduct or structural changes that may constitute abuses of a dominant position.
9 See, e.g., Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1984). See also R.
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lyze the Common Market cases, I ask whether Common Market
principles that explicitly incorporate values such as fairness, access,
and choice necessarily impair prospects for efficient outcomes, and
I suggest a defense in Common Market cases under article 86 that
should assure efficient results in the Community and could provide
guidance and insight for American policymaking.
II.

History and Evolution of the Law

In their inception, the U.S. antitrust laws reflected a pervasive
distrust of concentrated economic power and an aspiration to assure economic opportunity to all. By the end of the 1950s, at the
time of the adoption of the Treaty of Rome, the Supreme Court of
the United States was applying antitrust law to protect the viability
of small and middle-sized businesses, to preserve the freedom of
action of independent business people, and to disperse economic
and political power. These goals and themes became even more
explicit in the middle and later 1960s, and dovetailed with the civil
rights commitments of that time. Beginning in the mid-1970s,
however, U.S. antitrust law took a different course. "Efficiency" became and is the watchword of the 1980s. Government enforcers
urge, and some courts accept, the view that antitrust law should be
applied only to improve efficiency. At a minimum, most courts
would decline to apply the law in ways that impair efficiency. 10
While enforcement objectives have shifted between protecting
a process, doing equity, and promoting efficiency, none of the U.S.
antitrust statutes are regulatory in the sense of authorizing government intervention to fix price or output, control entry or exit, or
determine the fairness of the terms of a bargain.
Europeans have a different political tradition. They tend to be
less hostile to government as regulator and more skeptical of private corporations as servants of the public interest. In devising its
own antitrust law, the Community embraced a competition policy
principally as a means of integrating the economies of the Member
States." Only secondarily the Community endorsed competition
as a way to strengthen the economy and serve buyers within the
Community.12
Moreover, the founders of the Community did not oppose bigness. They observed that business units within the Common Market were often below optimal scale as a consequence of the trade
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PER-

SPECTIVE (1976).

10
11
12
share

See generally Fox, supra note 3.
See Verloren van Themaat, supra note 5, at 436-37.
One may infer, from the variety of economic systems, that all Member States do not
the American view that competition is the best way to allocate resources.
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barriers that limited the size of available markets. By breaking
down the barriers at Member State lines, the drafters of the Treaty
hoped to provide markets big enough to support the larger units
that efficiency demanded. Mergers were a means to achieve optimal scale. They could also produce desired countervailing forces
against foreign-based multinationals that were expanding in the
Common Market countries. Further, mergers between firms in different Member States could help to integrate the economies of the
Member States. Mergers were viewed as a benefit, not a threat. 13
For more than the first decade after adoption of the Treaty, no
case brought for infringement of article 86 reached the European
Community's high court, the Court ofJustice. During the same period, the U.S. Supreme Court was giving increasingly expansive interpretations to the United States antitrust laws. In this period,
scholars compared article 86 with section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Several comparativists saw U.S. law as concerned with protecting
competitors at the expense of consumers. Moreover, they noted
interpretations of U.S. law that prevented the creation or growth of
monopoly power, virtually per se. 14 They observed that article 86,
in contrast, was neutral towards creation of power. 15 The European Economic Community wished not to prevent the emergence
of power but to control its use. 16 At least one commentator urged
that Common Market law stay on its separate course and reject the
U.S. approach on grounds that adoption of the U.S. model would
threaten the interests of Common Market consumers.1 7
In the last decade, however, a curious thing happened. Common Market law on abuse of a dominant position moved away from
that narrow path that some had thought was laid out for it-regulating performance of firms with power. U.S. law, meanwhile, re13 See R. JOLIET, MONOPOLISATION AND ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION; A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF THE AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN APPROACHES TO THE CONTROL OF ECONOMIC POWER
3-4 (1970); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRD REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 28-29 (1974); Memorandum of the European Economic Community to the Governments of Member States, Concentration of Enterprises in the Common Market 7-9 (Dec. 1,

1965).
The Treaty for the European Coal and Steel Community (Treaty of Paris), which became effective in 1951, includes a provision for merger control. In the Treaty for the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), a provision for merger control is noticeably
absent. See B. HAWK, supra note 3, at 664, for the proposed regulation on merger control.
14 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
15 See R. JOLIET, supra note 13, at 8-13, 131-33; James, The Concept ofAbuse in EEC Competition Law: An American View, 92 LAW Q REv. 242 (1976). But see A. JACQUEMIN, ABUSE OF
DOMINANT POSITION AND CHANGING EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE IN THE UK AND EEC
129 (George &Joll eds. 1975); Temple Lang, Abuse of Dominant Positions in European Commu-

nity Law, Present and Future: Some Aspects, 1978
1979).
16 See R. JOLIET, supra note 13, at 131-33.
17 James, supra note 15, at 256-57.

FORDHAM CORP.

L.

INST.

25 (B. Hawk ed.
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sponding to fears that expansive applications of antitrust may
impair efficiency, retrenched. The two lines of law may already
have crossed, with Common Market law controlling conduct and
structure more than performance, and protecting equity more than
efficiency, and with U.S. law controlling conduct and structure less
vigorously, and protecting efficiency more than equity.
III. The Kinds of Offenses Under Article 86
Section 2 of the Sherman Act contains only general language.
It is declared a felony to monopolize, to combine or conspire to
monopolize, or to attempt to monopolize.18
Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome is more specific.' 9 It lists as
examples of abuse of a dominant position: (a) imposing unfair
prices, (b) limiting production, 20 (c) applying dissimilar conditions
to equivalent transactions, thereby disadvantaging the disfavored
party,2 ' and (d) tying unrelated articles.22
In each example, the conduct described may be a way of exploiting existing market power. Conduct described by two of the
examples, raising price and restricting output, correspond with the
classic uses of market power. The power to raise price and limit
output is often identified as the core economic evil which antitrust
is designed to deter. Yet the Common Market prohibitions against
monopoly pricing and unilateral output restrictions find no parallel
in U.S. antitrust law. It is not illegal for a U.S. firm, acting alone, to
restrict its output and to charge monopoly prices. 23 This is because
the U.S. law is not regulatory (in the sense of direct regulation of
18 Section 2 of the Sherman Act states: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize... shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... " 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
19 Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome states:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
Common Market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the Common Market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may in particular consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, market or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
20 Thus, monopoly pricing and output restriction may be an abuse.
21 Thus, price discrimination that puts the disfavored party at a disadvantage with its
competitors is an abuse.
22 Thus, the tying of unrelated articles is an abuse.
23 See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
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price and output) but rather concentrates on preserving conditions
whereby free market forces constrain price and induce optimal
production.
The Treaty's other two examples of abuse, certain price discrimination and certain tying arrangements, could give rise to a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. But in the United States this
conduct is, more centrally, the subject of other statutes that do not
require a monopoly position for violation, namely section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 2 4 section 3 of the Clayton Act, 2 5 and the Robinson26
Patman Act.
While the first two examples in article 86 contain classic economic evils, charging monopoly prices and limiting production,
which distort resource allocation by causing too few resources to
flow into the monopolized market, the third and fourth examples,
certain price discrimination and tying, may even increase output.
Tie-ins may be used as a way to price discriminate; that is, to charge
more to heavy users. Tying to effectuate price discrimination may
increase output because the monopolist's profit-maximizing alternative is to set a uniform price for the tying product that will virtually always be higher than the lowest discriminatory price, causing
some potential buyers to forego the purchase. Thus, abuses described in the Treaty, while they may be coercive or inequitable, are
27
not necessarily inefficient.
The type of conduct or performance that constitutes abuse of a
dominant position is not limited to the four examples above.
"Abuse" spans a wider range. As revealed by the case law, this
range includes not only strategies to maintain or increase market
power but also strategies to compete or to increase profits. These
24

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).

25

15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).

26 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982).
27 See A. JACQUEMIN, supra note 15, at 135. Price discrimination and tying may be inefficient, even in the narrow sense of reducing aggregate economic welfare. See, e.g., Kaplow,
Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLuM. L. REV. 515 (1985); Mueller, United
States'Antitrust: At the Crossroads, in MAINSTREAMS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (University
of Amsterdam, Aug. 22, 1985) (in publication, de Jong and Shepherd eds.).
Greater output does not necessarily imply increased economic welfare. While a strategy that increases output implies that marginal buyers are better satisfied, the same strategy
might harm intramarginal buyers who would have preferred conditions prior to adoption of
the strategy. See Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 BELL J. OF ECON. 417 (1975).
The harm to intramarginal buyers may be greater than the gain to marginal buyers. Id.
Comanor and Kirkwood show the implications of this insight for policy regarding resale
price maintenance. Comanor & Kirkwood, Resale Price Maintenance and Antitrust Policy, 3
CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES 9 (1985).

For a discussion of different conceptions of efficiency put forward by American and
Community policymakers and scholars, see Fox, panelist, in ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICY
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 1984 FORDIIAM CORP. L. INST. 708-10 (B. Hawk ed. 1985).
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latter strategies may not harm consumers but may harm competitors, distributors, or other intermediate buyers.
The first "abuse" case to come before the Court of Justice on
its merits was a case of alleged strengthening of a dominant position through merger. I begin with this case, which raised the important question of the scope of article 86: Is it confined to
controlling abusive performance of dominant firms, or does it also
reach the creation of market structures that lessen competition?
After treating the merger case, I turn to the control of excessive pricing-a European mode of antitrust regulation; and, finally,
to a series of acts that may exclude smaller competitors and resellers from opportunities to sell: refusals to deal, price discrimination, loyalty discounts, and exclusive dealing. In connection with
the latter category, I consider the relationship between efficiency
and the principles that protect opportunities of competitors.
IV.

Increasing Dominance by Acquisition
A.

Continental Can

At this writing only one acquisition case has been decided by
the Court ofJustice.2 8 This is the celebrated case of Europemballage
and Continental Can v. Commission.2 9 Continental Can, an American
company, acquired firms in related product lines in the Common
Market. The case raised the fundamental question whether an acquisition that increases a dominant position can ever, for that reason alone, be an abuse of a dominant position prohibited by article
86.
An affirmative answer required hurdling three obstacles. First,
the Treaty does not contain a provision for merger control, apparently by design. Second, the Treaty requires an "abuse," or, according to the French text, "abusive exploitation." All of the four
explicit examples of abuse stated in the Treaty are practices that
directly harm buyers or trading parties; no example concerns
changes in market structure that increase market power. Third, article 86 prohibits only an "abuse... of a dominant position." This
implies that the power that underlies the dominant position must
be used to inflict the harm that constitutes the abuse; in other
words, that there must be a causal connection between the domi28 The Philip Morfis-Rothmans case is currently pending before the Court of Justice.
This case involves the acquisition by Philip Morris, a major American cigarette company, of
stock in a firm that controls Brinkmanns, a major German cigarette company. Philip Morris
and Brinkmanns are competitors in European markets. A major issue is whether Philip
Morris's planned acquisition-of less than 25% of the voting stock-is sufficient to give it
power to influence the activities of Brinkmanns. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, points 98-100 (1985).
29 1973 E.C.R. 215, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8171.
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nant position and the abuse.30
While any one of these arguments might have defeated application of article 86 to mergers, the arguments failed. The Court of
Justice chose to construe the words of article 86 to give effect to the
spirit of the Treaty of Rome rather than to give unbending allegiance to technicalities.
If article 86 did not reach mergers, said the Court, enterprises
could achieve through merger "such dominance as to virtually remove any serious possibility of competition," and could thus "jeopardize the proper functioning of the Common Market." 3' The
Court concluded that abuse may occur if a firm in a dominant position "strengthens that position to the point where the degree of
domination achieved substantially hampers competition, so that
only enterprises which in their market conduct are dependent on
32
the dominant enterprise would remain on the market."
From the point of view of competition policy, the construction
of article 86 to prohibit mergers that strengthen dominance is wise.
From a U.S. policy standpoint, the interesting point is not that article 86 has been construed to cover mergers that strengthen a dominant position, but that it was entirely possible that article 86 might
have been construed not to reach this core evil and that it may have
been found to reprehend only the monopoly prices that the merger
enables and invites the firm to charge.
B. A Comparison
U.S. antitrust law has grappled with similar questions. At the
turn of the century, U.S. law allowed mergers that "merely" created
market power. United States Steel Corporation bought 180 independent steel firms, acquiring most of the domestic production
of steel. The company, however, had engaged in no "brutalities or
tyrannies." The government sued. The district court dismissed the
government case, and the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court on
appeal. The Supreme Court, in a split decision, found no violation.33 The Court repudiated the government's position that the
size and power of the corporation can be unlawful regardless of
34
whether the power was exerted and regardless of purpose.
30 See Vogelenzang, Abuse of a Dominant Position in Article 86, The Problem of Causality and
Some Applications, 13 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 61 (1976). See also Korah, InterpretationandAppli-

cation of Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome: Abuse of a Dominant Position Wtithin the Common Market,
53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 768, 775 n.29 (1978).
31

1973 E.C.R. 215, 243-44, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)

8171, at 8300.
32 Id. at 245, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8171, at 8300.
33 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
34 In the words of the Court, the government was
reduced to the assertion that the size of the Corporation, the power it may have,
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In later years the law changed. It became clear that corporate
consolidation was a "contract or combination" and that a merger
would violate section 1 of the Sherman Act if it had the effect of
unreasonably restraining competition, despite the absence of brutalities or tyrannies.3 5 In the first half of the century, however, the
Supreme Court was reluctant to find that acquisitions without brutalities had the proscribed effect. 36 As industry became more highly
concentrated through mergers, Congress reacted by passing the
Celler-Kefauver Amendment3 7 to section 7 of the Clayton Act, providing for stronger merger control. U.S. law now clearly prohibits
acquisitions that will probably lessen competition. Neither exercise
of market power nor preexisting market power is a necessary condition to the violation. Moreover, the merger need not threaten to
create (or increase) a dominant position of a single firm. Mergers
that threaten competition by facilitating cooperative behavior are
likewise illegal.
Thus, while the Court ofJustice took an important step toward
protection of competition when it decided Continental Can, the
Common Market law on mergers provides only a part of the protection afforded by U.S. law. It falls short in two respects. First, for
mergers to fall within the Common Market proscription, the acquiring company must already have a dominant position. Second, the
Common Market law as it applies to mergers seems to address only
threats to competition by increasing single-firm dominance and not
38
threats to competition by creating or increasing oligopoly power.
Law in the Common Market could be developed to cover oligopoly situations. When a market is highly concentrated and noncompetitive, the leading firms could be said to share a dominant
position. If any one of those undertakings acquires a competitor or
potential competitor and thereby increases the joint market power
of the incumbents, it could be found to have abused the dominant
position.3 9
Even if law should develop along these lines, a gap in coverage
not the exertion of the power, is an abhorrence to the law, or, as the Government
says, "the combination embodied in the Corporation unduly restrains competition
by its necessary effect .... and therefore is unlawful regardless of purpose." . . . To
assent to that, to what extremes should we be led?
Id. at 450 (emphasis in original).
35 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
36 See id.
37 Ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982)).
38 The U.S. Justice Department's 1984 Merger Guidelines suggest that the most common harmful property of anticompetitive mergers is the creation or aggravation of oligopoly behavior. See 1984Justice Department Merger Guidelines, 2 TRADE REG. REPORTER
4490-4495. See generally Symposium, 1982 Meiger Guidelines, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 280, 280-672
(1983).
39 See Temple Lang, supra note 15, at 72-76; Temple Lang, Regulating MlhdtinationalCor-
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may remain, for the language of the Treaty of Rome does not seem
to reach mergers that create a dominant position. 40 Mergers that
create market power are at least as significant a problem as mergers
that increase market power. Ideally, the gaps in the law should be
closed.
V.

Imposing Unfair Prices or Trading Conditions
A.

The Court ofJustice Cases

The Treaty contemplates a role for government in regulating
firm performance. Article 86 states as its first example of abuse:
"(a) an ... imposition of any inequitable ... prices or of any other
inequitable trading conditions .... ."4 Thus, charging an "unfair"
price is an offense.
In three early cases, Parke, Davis & Co. v. Centrafarm,4 2 Sirena v.
Eda,43 and Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro,4 4 the Court of Justice
noted the possibility that industrial property rights might be used
in ways that abuse a dominant position. An excessive price, it said,
would be an abusive exploitation. The court said in Sirena that
although the price level may not be an abuse in itself, a high price
may, "if unjustified by any objective criteria and if it is particularly
45
high, be a determining factor."
The above cases discuss the possibility of excessive pricing. In
two cases, General Motors Continental N.V. v. Commission 4 6 and United
Brands v. Commission,4 7 the Commission found that a dominant firm
in fact maintained excessive prices and thereby abused its dominant
position. In both cases, however, the Court of Justice disagreed
that the prices were excessive.
In General Motors Continental, Belgium had delegated to all automobile manufacturers' representatives the duty to inspect and issue
certificates of conformity for all vehicles coming into the country.
For a period of about four months, General Motors charged a very
high fee for this service, affecting five Opel automobiles, all imported from Germany. When its customers complained, General
porate Concentration-The European Economic Community, in 2 MICHIGAN YEARBOOK INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES 144 (1981).

40 A proposed regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings
would, however, apply to mergers that create monopoly or oligopoly power. See B. HAWK,
supra note 3, at 664-65 and app. 25.
41 Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 86.
42 1968 E.C.R. 55, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8054.
43 1971 E.C.R. 69, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) T 8101.
44 1971 E.C.R. 487, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9 8106.
45 1971 E.C.R. 69, 84, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8101,
at 7112.
46 1975 E.C.R. 1367, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9 8320.
47 1978 E.C.R. 207, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8429.
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Motors immediately gave refunds. The Commission charged and
found that General Motors had a dominant position in granting
certificates of conformity for General Motors automobiles crossing
at the Belgian border and that the high fee was an abuse of a dominant position.
General Motors sued for annulment,48 denying dominance, denying abuse, and raising the interesting questions of whether article
86 may be violated even though interbrand competition is not distorted and even though the only challenged act is an intrabrand
"toll" charge. The Advocate General 49 opined that both questions
should be answered affirmatively.
The Court of Justice upheld the Commission's view of dominance. Belgium put General Motors in the position of a monopoly
by giving it the sole right to inspect and issue the certificate for
incoming GM vehicles. As holder of this monopoly, General Motors had a dominant position.
Moreover, the Court determined that a firm could abuse its
dominant position by charging a price "which is excessive in relation to the economic value of the service provided, and which has
the effect of curbing parallel imports[ 50 ] by neutralizing the possibly more favourable level of prices applying in other sales areas in
the Community, or by leading to unfair trade in the sense of Article
86(2)(a)."-51 In view of General Motors' immediate refunds, however, the Court found no actionable abuse.
The most recent excessive pricing case to reach the Court of
Justice is United Brands v. Commission,5 2 involving the producer of the
famous Chiquita banana. Because of varying national preferences,
different availabilities of fruits, and differentials in currency, bananas are sold at widely disparate retail prices in different Member
States. Likewise, United Brands charged different prices to ripener-distributors in different Member States. Its prices in Belgium
48 General Motors claimed in its suit for annulment that: (1) the proper product market
was "all automobiles;" (2) General Motors did not have a dominant position; (3) that the
fee had no effect on competition and did not interfere with parallel imports (see note 50
infra); and (4) that General Motors' acts were justified because the incidents were few and
they responded immediately to complaints even before they were aware of the Commission's intervention. 1975 E.C.R. at 1370-74, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8320, at 7729-32.
49 The Advocate General is an individual appointed by the Court ofJustice to advise
the Court. He or she reads the briefs, hears argument, and writes a learned opinion which
the judges may or may not follow but which is usually influential to the Court. The opinion
of the Advocate General is published along with the judgment of the Court.
50 Parallel imports are imports from another Member State of goods that also originate
within that Member State. The principle against interference with parallel imports is the
same as the principle in favor of market integration.
51 1975 E.C.R. at 1379, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8320, at
7735.
52 1978 E.C.R. 207, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429.
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were on an average 80% higher than its prices in Ireland. Using
the Irish price level as the benchmark for a fair price, the Commission determined that the higher prices were unfair and ordered
United Brands to reduce its other prices by at least 15%.
The Court of Justice annulled the Commission's decision on
unfair pricing. It affirmed the principle that "charging a price
which is excessive because it has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product supplied [would be] . . . an abuse,"53

but held that the Commission had not proved that the prices were
excessive. The Irish prices were shown to be at levels below cost as
54
a means to break into the market.
In dictum regarding how the Commission might prove excessive pricing, the Court gave further insight into its conception of
the character of the offense. First, it said, one must determine
whether the difference between cost and price is excessive. If the
answer is affirmative, then the question is "whether a price has been
imposed which is either unfair in itself or when compared to com55
peting products."
In no case has the Court of Justice found that a price was excessive and therefore "unfair" in violation of article 86.56
B. A Comparison
The Common Market law on excessive pricing has profound
implications. It assumes that high pricing is unfair, it assumes that
unfairly high pricing can be identified by courts, and it implies that
courts are better mechanisms than markets to correct unfairly high
pricing.
The Community's legal standard is not the model of clarity.
53 Id. at 301, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429, at 7718.
54 The Court correctly held that the 7% difference between the price of United Brands'
Chiquita bananas and the price charged by United Brands' principal competitors could not
be the basis for a calculation of "excessiveness." It is possible that United Brands' costs
were higher than those of its competitors. It might, for example, have spent more money
for higher quality ripening, or for advertising.
55 1978 E.C.R. at 302, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429,
at 7718. The Court believed that the Commission's task, although difficult, was manageable. The Commission, it said, "was at least under a duty to require [United Brands] to
produce particulars of all the constituent elements of its production costs." Id. Had the
Commission attempted to learn United Brands' costs, it might also have discovered that
United Brands' average price was not supracompetitive. According to its accounting
records, United Brands lost money over a period of several years before the proceeding.
Of course, United Brands may have subsidized low prices in some geographic areas, where
it wished to break in or where competition was intense, with profits from higher prices
derived from other geographic areas or from winter sales.
56 A firm in a dominant position in a buying market could in theory abuse its dominant
position by forcing sellers to sell to it at an unfairly low price, thus misusing its monopsony
power. This offense was charged but not proved in C.I.C.C.E. v. Commission, [1983-1985
Transfer Binder] COMMON MxT. REP. (CCH)
14,157 (1985).
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The Court of Justice defines a price as excessive when it has no
reasonable relation to economic value.- 7 Even if the price is excessive as compared with costs, the Court states, the Commission must
consider whether the price is unfair "either ...in itself or as compared to competing products." 58 However, the price must have reflected its value to the buyer or there would have been no sale.
Moreover, the few competitors may take advantage of the monopolist's price umbrella, so that comparison of the dominant firm's
price with its competitors' prices may prove nothing at all. Finally,
even if the Court means to say only that it condemns monopolistic
pricing, formidable judicial problems of identification and surveillance remain.
A wholly separate problem is, in some cases, the tendency of
the law to undermine incentives. The three early cases 59 hold that
if an intellectual property right gives the owner a dominant position
in the Common Market, the owner may not exercise the property
right to keep price at an "excessive" level. Yet, the right to exploit
by charging what the market will bear may be seen as the reward for
invention and the incentive for future inventions.6 0
The General Motors case raised a question of a different sort.
The high price of the toll-taker was seen by the Court ofJustice not
just as an exploitation but as an obstruction of the flow of commerce. A monopoly toll charge at the Belgian border could indeed
be expected to have at least a marginal effect in discouraging parallel imports and thus interfering with the free flow of goods across
Member State lines.
U.S. law has no analogue to the Common Market law against
unfair prices and other terms of trade. American law rests on the
principle that price should be controlled by the free market unless
Congress has in effect determined that the market cannot work and
has established a regulatory commission. If a firm attains monopoly on its competitive merits and if the firm prices at monopoly
levels, the high price itself may invite new entry and expanded competition, and market forces would gradually wear away the monop1
oly power.6
The Treaty of Rome, in contrast, bestows upon the Commis57 1978 E.C.R. at 301, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429,
at 7718.
58 Id.
59 Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, 1971 E.C.R. 487, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8106; Sirena v. Eda, 1971 E.C.R. 69, [1971-1973 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8101; Parke, Davis & Co. v. Centrafarm, 1968 E.C.R.
55, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMMON MxT. REP. (CCH) 8054.
60 See Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rhom & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
61 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:981

sion and the Court the right and duty to limit excessive pricing.
This grant ofjudicial power underscores an essential difference between U.S. and Community law, at least as it appeared at the time
of the adoption of the Treaty. Barring transactions that created the
power to price "excessively" was at the core of U.S. law, while limiting the exercise of already achieved dominance was at the core of
article 86.
VI.
A.

Refusals to Deal

The Court ofJustice Cases

Several cases involving refusals to deal have reached the Court
ofJustice. Of these, ICI & Commercial Solvents Corporationv. Commission,62 United Brands v. Commission,63 Hugin KassaregisterAB v. Commission 6 4 (Hugin-Liptons), and Centre Belge d'Etudes des Marche-Telemarketing S.A. v. Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Telediffusion 65 (Tele-marketing) best illustrate the Common Market principle underlying a
dominant firm's duty to deal.
Commercial Solvents Corporation produced the raw materials
used to manufacture ethambutol, an anti-tuberculosis drug. Aminobutanol, one of the drugs, was also used as an emulsifier for
paint. Commercial Solvents acquired 51% of the shares of Istituto,
which bought the raw materials from Commercial Solvents and sold
them to an Italian company, Zoja. Zoja used the raw materials to
manufacture ethambutol-based anti-tuberculosis drugs.
Istituto sought to acquire Zoja, but the negotiations aborted.
Istituto then increased the price at which it sold aminobutanol to
Zoja. Zoja, however, discovered a cheaper source for aminobutanol-the firms that bought the raw material from Commercial Solvents for use in paint. Zoja therefore cancelled a large part of its
order from Istituto. Soon thereafter, Zoja's supply of cheaper aminobutanol dried up, not by chance but on command of Commercial
Solvents, which forbad its buyers in the paint market from reselling
the aminobutanol for the higher-valued pharmaceutical use. Commercial Solvents then announced that it would no longer sell the
raw material for anti-tuberculosis drugs. Rather, it would vertically
integrate to produce the drugs itself, which it did. When Zoja tried
to reorder aminobutanol from Commercial Solvents, Commercial
Solvents refused to accept the order, in accordance with its new
commercial policy.
The case went to the Court ofJustice. With only one page of
62
63
64
65

1974
1978
1979
1985

E.C.R. 223, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8209.
E.C.R. 207, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429.
E.C.R. 1869, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8524.
E.C.R. -, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 14,246.
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analysis on point, the Court ofJustice found that Commercial Solvent's refusal to sell the raw material to Zoja was an abuse of a dominant position. According to the Court, a firm with a dominant
position in a raw material cannot eliminate the "competition" of its
customer "just because it decides to start manufacturing" the end
product.
[A]n undertaking which has a dominant position in the market
in raw materials and which, with the object of reserving such raw
material for manufacturing its own derivatives, refuses to supply
a customer, which is itself a manufacturer of these derivatives,
and therefore risks eliminating all competition on the part of
this customer, is abusing its dominant position within the meaning of Article 86.66
The Court rejected Commercial Solvents' factual claim that it did
not have sufficient productive capacity to supply Zoja's needs as
well as its own, on grounds that Zoja's needs were only approximately 6% of Commercial Solvents' global production of the raw
67
material.
Five years later United Brands v. Commission came before the
68
Court of Justice, and the Court applied a similar principle.
United Brands was the biggest banana producer in the world and in
the Common Market. It owned the Chiquita brand banana, the best
known and most heavily promoted in the world. United Brands was
a vertically integrated company that accounted for approximately
40% to 45% of the sales of bananas in the Community. Its system
of distribution involved sales to ripener-distributors, who would
buy the green bananas, ripen them, and resell them.
Olesen, a ripener-distributor in Denmark, was the largest importer in Denmark of the Chiquita brand banana. Olesen wanted
United Brands to give it preferential treatment over United Brands'
other ripeners in Denmark, but United Brands refused to do so. In
response, while retaining its United Brands distributorship, Olesen
became the exclusive distributor for Standard Fruit (which later became Castle and Cooke). Standard Fruit, producer of the Dole banana, announced that it "was going to oust the 'Chiquita' banana
throughout the world." 69 Thereafter, according to United Brands,
66 Commercial Solvents, 1974 E.C.R. at 250-51, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MT.
(CCH) 8209, at 8820. It did not matter that Zoja had cancelled an order and therefore was not a customer at the moment because Commercial Solvents, in any event, would
have ceased supplying Zoja at the completion of deliveries it would otherwise have been
obliged to make.
67 If Commercial Solvents would have lost economies in distribution by foregoing use
of this capacity for its own account, the duty to deal would have imposed an inefficiency
upon it. Commercial Solvents apparently did not argue that this was the case.
68 1978 E.C.R. 207, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429.
69 Id. at 291, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429, at 7713.
REP.
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Olesen's sales of Chiquita bananas declined, Olesen deliberately
pushed the sale of Dole bananas, and it took more care in ripening
Dole bananas than in ripening Chiquita bananas. United Brands
terminated Olesen.
The Court of Justice held that the cut-off was an abuse of a
dominant position. According to the Court, a dominant firm"which cashes in on the reputation of a brand name known to and
valued by the consumers-cannot stop supplying a long-standing
customer who abides by regular commercial practice, if the orders
placed by that customer are in no way out of the ordinary." 70 The
Court thought that the cut-off "would limit markets to the prejudice
of consumers and would amount to discrimination which might in
'7
the end eliminate a trading party from the relevant market. "
Moreover, the Court held that the cut-off could not be justified
by United Brands' interest in quality performance by its ripenerdistributors, although it implied that a quality defense could succeed under some circumstances. Even if the possibility of a
"counter-attack" by the dominant firm against its wayward distributor is acceptable, the Court said, it "cannot be countenanced" if its
purpose is to strengthen the dominant position, and it must be
"proportionate to the threat taking into account the economic
strength" of the competition. In United Brands, said the Court, the
sanction was disproportionate to the alleged offense of Olesen.
The Court thought the cut-off would deter other ripener-distributors from supporting United Brands' competitors, thereby increasing its dominance.
Such a course of conduct amounts therefore to a serious interference with the independence of small and medium sized firms
in their commercial relations with the undertaking in a dominant position and this independence
implies the right to give
preference to competitors' goods. 72
Hugin-Liptons73 is a case of even broader implications because
Hugin, the manufacturer, did not hold a dominant position in the
market in which it competed. Its refusal to deal was a vertical distribution restraint with no potential to lessen competition between
Hugin and its competitors.
Hugin, a manufacturer of cash registers, accounted for approximately 13% of cash registers sold in the United Kingdom. National Cash Register accounted for 40% of the market, and the
second and third ranking firms held, respectively, 18% and 16%.
70
71
72
73

Id. at 292, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429, at 7714.
Id.
Id. at 293, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429, at 7715.
1979 E.C.R. 1869, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8524.
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Liptons was in the business of servicing, repairing, and reconditioning cash registers. It bought spare parts from an importer of Hugin
cash registers, and later became the main sales agent for Hugin in
Great Britain, while continuing its service and repair business. It
also entered the business of providing cash registers for rent.
After Liptons had been Hugin's main distributor in Great Britain for a few years, Hugin offered Liptons a new distributorship
agreement. Liptons refused because in its view the profit margins
were too low. Thereafter, Hugin refused to supply Liptons with
cash registers or parts at wholesale. Liptons tried to get the parts
elsewhere but failed because Hugin maintained a selective distribution system, confined spare parts to its authorized distributors, and
prohibited the distributors from selling the parts to others.
The Commission determined that Hugin's refusal to supply
spare parts to Liptons was an abuse of a dominant position in
Hugin spare parts. In the Commission's view the refusal deprived
users of free choice by excluding a substantial competitor in the
market for servicing and repairs of Hugin machines.7 4 Hugin's argument was threefold: (1) the market was cash registers and the
cash register market was highly competitive; (2) Hugin confined
spare parts to its distributors to oversee quality and promote rapid
and inexpensive maintenance; and (3) Hugin could assure such
quality and efficiency only by working in close cooperation with
qualified technicians.
The Court of Justice held that the conduct did not affect trade
between Member States. It therefore need have gone no further,
but it did choose to address one of the two central substantive
questions: the definition of the relevant market and Hugin's position in that market. The Court did not determine whether the conduct constituted an abuse.
The Court found the relevant market was Hugin spare parts. It
observed that there are independent undertakings that specialize in
maintenance and repair of cash registers, reconditioning used cash
registers, selling used machines, and renting machines. These
firms needed Hugin spare parts for Hugin machines because cash
register parts made by other manufacturers were not compatible
74 In general, the Advocate General agreed with the Commission. He maintained that
the refusal to deal eliminated the only important competitor in the secondary market and
thus was equivalent to limiting markets and sales outlets. Specifically rejecting the argument that concentration in the provision of spare parts permits increased competition in
cash registers, the Advocate General found "fundamental objections to such a 'balancing
out' of factual situations which involve the complete elimination of independent maintenance undertakings and thus a fundamental alteration of the structure of competition." Id.
at 1914, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MiT. REP. (CCH) 8524, at 7468. Thus,
he rejected the concept, fully accepted in U.S. law, that benefits to interbrand competition
justified elimination of intrabrand competition.
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with Hugin machines. "Consequently," said the Court, "the market thus constituted by Hugin spare parts required by independent

undertakings must be regarded as the relevant market.

. ..

75

The

conclusion followed: Hugin had a dominant position.
Had Hugin's acts affected Member State commerce, Hugin
would have faced the serious risk of violation of article 86.
Most recently, in Tele-marketing,7 6 a Belgian firm, Centre Belge,
established the business of telemarketing to the French-speaking
community in the Benelux countries. It presented television advertising for its clients. The advertisements invited viewers to call
Centre Belge's telephone number to obtain information about the
products advertised or otherwise to respond to the advertisement.
Centre Belge's telephone staff would answer the calls and provide
the information. To conduct this operation, Centre Beige obtained
a one-year exclusive contract with the television station, R.T.L.
(through its agent I.P.B.). R.T.L. was a legal monopoly. At the end
of the year I.P.B. notified Centre Belge and the advertisers that
R.T.L. would henceforth accept telemarketing advertising spots
only if I.P.B.'s telephone number was used. This would have put
Centre Beige out of the telemarketing business. It sued for an injunction in the Belgian court, and the Belgian court referred two
questions to the Court ofJustice. First, can a firm be in a dominant
position within the meaning of article 86 where it enjoys a legal
monopoly in a market, and, by reason of the law, there can be no or
very little competition in that market? The Court answered in the
affirmative.
Second, the Belgian court sought an interpretation of the nature of abuse. Centre Beige claimed that the challenged condition
was an abuse on its face. Defendants claimed, to the contrary, that
the condition could not be an abuse as such. They argued that an
abuse does not occur unless and until power is misused and that
abusive conduct "must be likely to harm consumers, for example,
by the imposition of unfair prices or conditions." 7 7 On the facts,
defendants argued that the condition was justified for economic
reasons; that I.P.B. was close to the pulse of the television station
and would be alert to program changes made on short notice, and
that it was necessary to conduct telemarketing in-house to preserve
that station's image because viewers assumed that the telephone
number was that of the station, they expected their questions about
the station to be answered, and they expected attentive service and
would fault the station for any shortcomings.
75 Id. at 1897, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8524, at
7458.
76 1985 E.C.R. -, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] COMMON MxT. REP. (CCH) 14,246.
77 [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
14,246, at 16,458.
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The Court's answer most nearly favored the interpretation of
Centre Beige. Relying on Commercial Solvents, the Court said that
where a dominant firm supplies a service that is indispensable to
the activities of a firm operating on another market, a refusal to
supply the service is an abuse if "the refusal is not justified by technical or commercial requirements relating to the nature of the [first
market], but is intended to reserve" for itself or its agent the business in the second market, with the possibility of eliminating all
competition from another firm. 7 8 Thus, defendants would have to
justify their refusal to deal. The important point is that defendants
lost on their claim that abuse is dependent upon harm to
consumers.
B.

A Comparison

In the United States the law on duty to deal has evolved from
quite different first principles. Under U.S. law, the freedom to deal
or not to deal is a basic element of freedom of trade. In United States
v. Colgate & Co. ,79 the Supreme Court stated that, absent a purpose
to create or maintain a monopoly, the Sherman Act "does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer.., freely
to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom
80
he will deal."
Freedom to deal has been accorded even to a monopolist
under circumstances in which the monopolist has no incentive to
lessen competition by the refusal. In Official Airline Guides, Inc. v.
FTC,8 1 the court held that a monopoly publisher of airline schedules had no duty not to discriminate between certified air carriers
and commuter airlines, even if its discriminatory (separate) listings
lessened competition in the airline market. The publisher did not
participate in competition in the airline market, so it would not benefit from lessened competition in that market. The expected cost of
limiting the publisher's freedom of action was therefore deemed
greater than the expected cost of, competitive harm.
Two principles, however, qualify the basic principle that an individual firm, acting alone, has the right to choose its customers.
First, there is a narrow "essential facilities" or "bottleneck monopoly" doctrine which holds that where a firm controls a facility that
cannot feasibly be duplicated, where access to the facility by competitors is necessary for effective competition in the market, and
where the controlling firm can give access without degrading its
78 Id.
79 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
80 Id. at 307.
81 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981).
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own performance, the controlling firm must give access.8 2 Second,
a firm in a monopoly position may not engage in predatory strategies including refusals to deal when, by the refusal, the dominant
firm foregoes profit opportunities and imposes costs on itself in or83
der to impose greater costs on its competitor.
United States v. Terminal Railroad Association8 4 exemplifies the
case of the bottleneck monopoly. The defendant railroad controlled the only track across the Mississippi River at St. Louis, and
geographic obstacles prevented competitors from constructing another such facility in the near vicinity. Terminal Railroad Association denied its competitors non-discriminatory access. Lorain
JournalCo. v. United States8 5 exemplifies the case of predatory strategies. Lorain Journal, the only newspaper in town, was faced with
competition from a newly-formed radio station. It announced that
it would not deal with advertisers who bought time on the new radio station. Knowing that its customers needed to deal with it, the
newspaper hoped for a boycott that would cause the demise of its
competitor. In both cases, defendants violated section 2.
The recent Aspen Skiing case is a less powerful form of the latter
scenario. Aspen Skiing Company owned three of the four mountains at the popular Aspen resort. For a number of years Aspen
Skiing and the owner of the fourth mountain, Highlands, cooperated in the sale of a four-mountain ticket, to the pleasure of skiers
at Aspen. Aspen Skiing then decided not to cooperate in the sale of
the four-mountain ticket. It refused to sell tickets to Highlands for
use as part of a four-mountain pass, and it refused to honor vouchers supplied by Highlands to its skiers, although the vouchers were
equal to the price of a daily lift ticket for the three Aspen Skiing
mountains and were guaranteed by funds on deposit in the local
bank. Aspen Skiing thus sacrificed profit opportunities, even at the
risk of displeasing consumers. It may have believed that most skiers, unable to get a four-mountain pass, would exclusively patronize the three mountains of Aspen Skiing and that the increased
revenues from shifting skiers away from Highlands would more
than offset the lost revenues from refusing the vouchers.
The Aspen Skiing case is a weaker example of monopolization
than LorainJournal because in Lorain Journal the strategy was in82 See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United States v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 234 (1983).
83 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985). For a
recent case holding that a monopolist had no duty to continue its prior practice of encouraging its salesforce to promote its competitor's product, see Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v.
Western Union Tele. Co., 1986-1 Trade Cas. T 67,189 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.).
84 244 U.S. 383 (1912).
85 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
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tended and likely to destroy a competitor, a new entrant into a monopolized market. In Aspen Skiing the strategy may or may not have
destroyed Highlands, inducing a sell-out to Aspen; the Court did
not explore the possibility. The important point was that Aspen
Skiing's strategy destroyed an option that consumers wanted, thus
undermining the antitrust value of consumer sovereignty. It is not
apparent in either case, however, that the dominant firm's strategy
was likely to produce an increment in power over price. In Lorain
Journal, the price of advertising in the Journal was constrained not
only by the new radio station but also by numerous other alternatives for advertising and promotion. In Aspen Skiing, the price of
the ski lift on the three Aspen Skiing mountains was constrained
not only by the price charged by Highlands but by numerous other
options for skiers.
The U.S. cases suggest a focused framework for analysis. A refusal to deal is allowed if it is simply an instance of choosing one's
customers and of deciding how best to provide the goods and services that the consumer wants. A refusal to deal by a firm in a monopoly position is impermissible if its natural effect is to lessen
competition and thereby raise prices to consumers or otherwise degrade the price/service package offered to them.
The analysis may be guided by a series of questions. Was the
refusal to deal a product of defendant's plan to wage more effective
competition and to sell more goods or services by increasing consumers' satisfaction? Or was it a pressure tactic to eliminate or impose costs on a competitor and thereby to increase monopoly
power or, at least, market share?
One basic question is whether the defendant would have pursued the same strategy if the market would remain as competitive
after the challenged conduct as before the conduct. If the answer is
no, then the purpose of the refusal was almost surely to increase
market power, and purpose is a proxy for probable effect. If the
answer is yes, then the purpose of the refusal was almost surely not
to increase market power.8 6 The purpose may have been to gain
productive efficiencies. It may also have been to exploit more fully
existing power or opportunities.8 7
I now apply the framework of U.S. law to the Common Market
cases. I ask the following questions, which are designed to suggest
86 See Ordover & Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricingand Product Innovation,
91 YALE Lj. 8 (1981). Cf. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
87 For an example of U.S. law in this third category, see United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours, 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (du Pont's stock interest in General Motors gave it an advantage in competing for General Motors' purchases of fabrics and finishes, but no claim was
made that General Motors got lower quality or paid a higher price).
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the purpose and effect of each set of restraints: Is the challenged
refusal to deal output-limiting (thus likely to increase market
power), is it exploitative, and/or is it cost-reducing?
Commercial Solvents is a case of internal vertical integration. The
decision to vertically integrate did not, as the Court ofJustice said,
eliminate a competitor; it substituted one competitor for another.
Unless the integration itself raised barriers to entry, price to the
consumer after the integration was likely to be no higher than price
to the consumer before the integration.
It is at least possible that the decision to integrate was motivated by Commercial Solvents' prospect of capturing for itself all of
the monopoly profits from control over the raw material, rather
than sharing these monopoly profits with Zoja. Since aminobutanol
had two uses, one of which (anti-tuberculosis drugs) commanded
monopoly profits and one of which (paint emulsifiers) did not,
Commercial Solvents would profit-maximize by price discrimination; but price discrimination proved difficult because the low-cost
buyers were reselling the product for the higher-valued pharmaceutical use and this arbitrage would soon drive the price for the two
uses to equality. The profit-maximizing response to arbitrage was
integration into the business of the high-valued use.8 8 If the only
purpose and effect of the vertical integration and cut-off was to enable Commercial Solvents to discriminate and thus to extract the
extra profits from the raw material in its drug use, then the vertical
integration combined with the refusal to continue to supply the old
customer would not offend section 2 of the Sherman Act.
United Brands' strategy, in contrast, was not vertical integration; it was maintenance of an effective system of independent distributors. One of its major distributors (Olesen) was, allegedly,
disloyal because it aggressively supported a competitor's advertising campaign and neglected United Brands' product. United
Brands decided to terminate that distributor and, presumably, to
appoint a new distributor or to increase the business of its other
distributors.
The Court of Justice apparently believed that United Brands'
termination of Olesen increased market power, but it did not ask
the right question. To determine whether the cut-off could have
increased market power, the Court should have asked: Could a banana ripener-distributor realize all significant economies of scale
without handling Chiquita bananas? If the answer is yes, then even
exclusive dealing contracts between United Brands and its distribu88 If Commercial Solvents' integration increased barriers to entry into the market for
the production of ethambutol or the market for the production of the raw material, the
integration might also have been motivated by the prospect of increasing market power.
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tors would not impair competition to the detriment of consumers in
the banana market. Competitors could develop their own outlets.
Under U.S. law, the refusal to deal with the recalcitrant distributor
would not violate section 2. If the answer is no, as the Commission
argued, then United Brands would have leverage of the sort held by
Lorain Journal. By refusing to deal with distributors that handle
and promote a competitive brand, it could coerce distributors and
destroy or greatly weaken its competitors, to the detriment of competition and consumers. If that were the case, even if the purpose
of the termination was a good one-to get a distributor who would
take appropriate care in ripening Chiquita bananas-the sanction
may have been excessive, even under U.S. law.
In Hugin-Liptons, we find an even greater gap between U.S. and
Common Market law. First, in the United States, a company's own
brand of product is almost never a market.8 9 Under Community
law, customer dependence may qualify a brand as a market. In
Hugin-Liptons, the Court ofJustice defined the market as spare parts
for Hugin machines in view of the demand by independent servicers and renting agents. In doing so it ignored facts that U.S.
courts would deem material; namely, that the independents could
get spare parts for the other cash registers from their producers
and that Liptons could be expected to shift its business to the servicing and renting of more cash registers produced by other firms. A
healthy market of independents who serviced and rented cash registers (made by other producers) would have remained.
When one asks whether Hugin's termination of Liptons was an
effort to monopolize, the misfit of the monopoly framework becomes plain. Hugin was not a dominant cash register firm. It
surely could not get a monopoly by charging a supracompetitive
price for spare parts, and it would undercut its competitive attractiveness as a supplier of new machines if it developed a reputation
for overcharging for repairs. Only two hypotheses seem plausible.
Either Hugin was charging a low price for service and was providing rapid reliable service itself or through its authorized distributors, so as to wage more effective competition against its highly
aggressive competitors, or Hugin wanted to keep the servicing
business for itself and its authorized distributors and they were providing at least as good a price/service package as Liptons. Both for
lack of dominance and lack of anticompetitive conduct, American
courts would dismiss the case against Hugin.
Finally, in Tele-marketing, the strategy of the television station
89 See Calculators Hawaii, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., 724 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir. 1983);
Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 914-19 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S.
802 (1975); Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 577, 590 n.28 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 868 (1974).
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was probably to appropriate for itself a lucrative business that had
been started up by its customer. Had the television station been
essentially concerned about confusion of viewers and the image of
the station, as it claimed, it could have required Centre Belge to
state clearly its identity and its lack of affiliation with the station;
and it could have given advertisers their choice of telemarketing
service suppliers. It is not possible, however, that the station's challenged condition that all telemarketing on its station must use its
agent's number could have given it increased power over price. In
other words, it is more likely that the condition unfairly ousted a
competitor than that it hurt consumers.
In sum, in its refusal-to-deal judgments the Court of Justice
reflects a belief that it is benefiting consumers, but in none of the
cases did the Court rely on facts indicating that the refusal to deal
harmed consumers. In each of the cases a value other than consumer interests was at stake. In Commercial Solvents, Zoja's business
and its manufacturing facility in Italy were in jeopardy. In United
Brands, a major part of Olesen's business in Denmark was
threatened. In Hugin-Liptons, a major part of Liptons' business in
Great Britain was at stake. In Tele-Marketing, the dominant firm
would have ousted and appropriated the goodwill of Centre Belge.
The victims in all four cases had made major investments and were
apparently good business citizens.
One suspects that the Court of Justice concludes too quickly
that refusals to deal harm consumers. To base a result on harm to
consumers where neither evidence nor theory indicates that such
harm exists undermines the legitimacy of Court of Justice judgments, although those judgments might have been justified by an
interest in protecting entrepreneurs.
I suggest, in the conclusory section, a model pursuant to which
the Court of Justice might appropriately find abuse even where the
Commission cannot prove that the refusal to deal is likely to harm
consumers. Under my model, liability would not result, however, if
both of the following situations obtain: the refusal to deal does not
increase market power, and the duty to deal would increase the
costs of the firm.
VII.

Price Discrimination, Loyalty Discounts,
and Exclusive Dealing
A.

The Court ofJustice Cases

Four cases involving loyalty discounts, price discrimination,
and exclusive dealing in lieu of price discrimination, have reached
the Court of Justice. I discuss here the three major cases: United
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Brands v. Commission,90 Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, 9 1 and N. V.
92
Nederlandsche Banden-IndustrieMichelin v. Commission.
The aspect of United Brands treated in this section involves
price discrimination. As seen above, United Brands sold bananas
to distributors, who would ripen the bananas and then resell them
locally to dealers. In the Community, there was not a single banana
market. Rather, regulations, policies, and conditions of various
Member States served to partition national markets. Relevant conditions included taxation, duties, wages, conditions of marketing,
currency fluctuations, national tastes, and different availability of
seasonal competing fruit. United Brands set the price of Chiquita
bananas to its ripener-distributors by reference to the supply and
demand as it affected the ultimate consumer in each Member State.
Accordingly, United Brands' prices to distributors in different
Member States varied by large margins, such as 54%, 80%, and
138%. Clauses in contracts with its distributors forbad the distributors from reselling green bananas, and United Brands supplied its
distributors with less than the quantity they ordered, thus guarding
against arbitrage of the bananas it sold to its distributors in the
lower-price territories.
The Court of Justice assumed that the price discrimination
placed certain ripener-distributors at a competitive disadvantage,
and it held that the discrimination violated article 86.9 According
to the Court, United Brands should have set its price with reference
to supply and demand as between the producer and the ripenerdistributor, not as between the producer and the customer. The
Court concluded that the discriminatory prices, varying according
to the circumstances of the Member States, "were just so many obstacles to the free movement of goods," 94 and that the restrictive
effect was aggravated by the green banana clause and the restriction
on quantities delivered. "A rigid partitioning of national markets
was thus created at price levels which were artificially different,
placing certain ripener-distributors at a competitive disadvantage,
since, compared with what it should have been, competition had
90 1978 E.C.R. 207, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT REP. (CCH) 8429.
91 1979 E.C.R. 461, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKr. REP. (CCH) 8527.
92 1983 E.C.R. -, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 14,031.
See also Suiker Unie UA v. Commission, 1975 E.C.R. 1663, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334.
93 United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 298, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8429, at 7716.
94 Id. at 299, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429, at 7717.
Author's note: Discriminatory prices are not in fact an obstacle to free movement. Rather,
if there are no barriers, discriminatory prices would induce movement. Lower-priced bananas would flow into Member States in which bananas commanded a higher price.
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thereby been distorted." 95
In United Brands, price discrimination was a means to extract
extra profits from the distributors located where the product was
more highly valued, reflecting the higher price available from certain buyers given the preexisting demand for the Chiquita brand.
By contrast, in Hoffmann-La Roche and Michelin, price discrimination
was a means to sell more product to buyers who might otherwise
have turned elsewhere, reflecting the larger demand for sellers'
product that could be secured by a selectively low price.
In Hoffmann-La Roche, the vitamin company was found to have a
dominant position in the Common Market in each of several vitamins, including vitamin A, of which it held 47%; vitamin B 3, of
which it held 41% to 51% (although its share was declining and
Japanese manufacturers accounted for nearly a third of the market),
and Vitamin B 6 , of which it held more than 80%. Roche had contracted to sell vitamins to 22 large purchasers, including companies
such as Merck and Unilever.
In some cases the purchaser agreed to buy several kinds of vitamins exclusively from Roche. Some contracts were requirements
contracts, entered into at the request of the purchaser who wanted
assurance that its requirements would be filled. In other cases, the
buyer agreed to buy most of its needs from Roche, and Roche contracted to give the buyer "fidelity rebates." These were discounts
that became effective as to all past purchases when the buyer passed
certain thresholds, representing portions of the buyer's requirements. The rebates generally applied cumulatively to the purchase
of more than one kind of vitamin.
The Court of Justice held that the exclusive supply and requirements contracts were an abuse of a dominant position, even as
to the requirements contracts entered into at the request of the
purchaser. According to the Court, these requirements contracts
were "not based on an economic transaction which justifies the burden or benefit but are designed to deprive the purchaser of or restrict his possible choices of sources of supply and to deny other
96
producers access to the market."
A major concern of the Court, in Hoffmann-LaRoche, was the
practice of giving fidelity rebates. The rebates were price discriminations based on loyalty, not quantity discounts based on lower
costs. Once a purchaser began to buy from Roche, the Court said,
97
the customer had a "powerful incentive" not to buy elsewhere.
The Court concluded that the practice distorted competition for
95

Id.

96 Hoffmann-LaRoche, 1979 E.C.R. at 540, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8527, at 7553.
97 Id. at 543, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8527, at 7555.
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three reasons: (1) it is "designed through the grant of a financial
advantage to prevent customers from obtaining their supplies from
competing producers;" (2) it constituted discrimination based on
exclusivity; and (3) it entrenched dominance, especially in an expanding market, "by means of a form of competition which is not
98
based on the transaction effected and is therefore distorted."
Likewise, the Court of Justice held that the tire manufacturer
Michelin abused its dominant position by price discrimination
through discounts. 99 Michelin, which was losing ground to competitors, devised a system of variable discounts based on annual sales
targets tailored to each dealer/customer. The Court found that the
system put increasing pressure on the dealers to meet their targets
in order to avoid suffering a loss for the entire year. The effect was
accentuated, said the Court, by the fact that Michelin's market share
was much larger than those of its main competitors. A competitor
would have to offer a much larger discount to make it worthwhile
for the dealer to purchase its tires from the competitor at the end of
the year. Referring also to the vagueness and changing nature of
the Michelin discount system, and the ubiquity of Michelin representatives who were always on hand to remind dealers of their situation, the Court characterized the strategy as calculated to prevent
dealers from freely choosing the most favorable offer.
It thus limits the dealers' choice of supplier and makes access to
the market more difficult for competitors. Neither the wish to
sell more nor the wish to spread production more evenly can
justify such a restriction of the customer's freedom of choice
and independence. The position of dependence in which dealers find themselves and which is created by the discount system
in question, is not therefore based on any countervailing advantage which may be economically justified.100
B. A Comparison
Study of the American analogue invites basic distinctions that
the Court of Justice ignored. In the banana case, United Brands engaged in the most typical kind of price discrimination: it sold at a
higher price for resale where the demand for bananas was less elastic and at a lower price for resale where it was more elastic. It prevented arbitrage by restrictions against resale of green bananas and
by selling to ripener-distributors no more bananas than they
needed for the Member State in which they sold. It thus equalized
98 Id. at 540, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8527, at 7553.
99 N.V. Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3461,
[1983-1985 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 14,031.
100 Id. at 3518, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 14,031, at
14,521.
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profit margins among its distributors, rather than giving some distributors the prospect of monopoly profits.
If the ripener-distributors who bought at the higher price were
actually in competition with the ripener-distributors who bought at
the lower price, United Brands would ostensibly have abused a
dominant position under the terms of the third example of article
86. However, if there had been competition between favored and
disfavored distributors, United Brands would not normally have
been able to maintain the price differential; the differential would
have been arbitraged away.
If there were culprits in the United Brands case, price discrimination was not among them. One source of distortion of competition was the green banana clause, which prevented arbitrage.01
Another was United Brands' refusal to sell more than the ripener's
needs, which reinforced the ban against selling green bananas. The
third source of restraint was Member State regulations, different
customs, and different consumer preferences, making bananas
dearer in some states than in others.
United Brands was held liable for abusing a dominant position
by secondary-line discrimination, although the favored and disfavored buyers did not compete. Under U.S. law, if favored and disfavored buyers are in competition and competition may be
lessened, price discrimination is illegal under the Robinson-Patman
Act even without proof that the discriminator has market or monopoly power.' 0 2 But the U.S. law does not proscribe price discrimination even by a dominant firm where the only effect is greater
ability to exploit by the discriminator.
A finding of illegal price discrimination in a case such as United
Brands may force a transfer of extra profits from the producer to the
distributor, or cause the producer to perform its own distribution
function (thus, vertically integrate) in the areas in which its product
is dearer.103
Unlike United Brands, Hoffmann-La Roche and Michelin are cases
of primary-line discrimination. That is, discrimination is used to
expand (or maintain) a dominant position to the disadvantage of
competitors of the discriminator. As the Court articulates the problem, the dealer also suffers a detriment because its choice of sup101 1978 E.C.R. at 218, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429,
at 7665. Such a clause might have been necessary to protect the quality of the ripening and
thus to protect the Chiquita name. Apparently the Court did not accept United Brands'
argument to this effect, and it held the green banana clause to be an infringement. Id.
102 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982). See Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428
(1983). See also Piraino, The Legality of DistributorIncentive Discount Plans Under the RobinsonPatman Act, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 807, 838-39 (1980).
103 ICI & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 223, [1974 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8209.
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plier is limited (supposedly by the irresistible pressure to buy at a
low price). Exclusive dealing and requirements contracts by dominant firms are likewise thought to have the infirmity of tying up the
incremental business of important customers and thereby leading
to the expansion of the dominant firm's market share for reasons
not on the merits, at the expense of the remaining competition.
U.S. courts would not conclude, with strokes so broad, that fidelity rebates and discounts, exclusive dealing, and requirements
contracts by dominant firms are illegal. Loyalty discounts are lowpriced competition. Requirements contracts tend to save costs (reduce risks and lower transaction costs) for buyers, and exclusive
dealing contracts can save costs for sellers, particularly when
knowledge of demand is important for production planning. Competition by lowering costs and lowering prices, even by a monopo10 4
list, is favored under U.S. law.
Under U.S. law, loyalty discounts and exclusive dealing contracts by a dominant firm could constitute monopolization only if
they maintain or increase market power or unnecessarily exclude
rivals and are not means of giving consumers what they want. 0 5
Loyalty discounts and exclusive dealing contracts could fit this description if:
1. The discounts constitute predatory pricing. That is, the
seller charges a price below its applicable cost or in any event it
charges a temporary low price that makes sense only on the hypothesis that it would eliminate or disable competitors and then
allow the dominant seller to raise price and reap a monopoly
profit. 10 6 (This was not the case in either Hoffmann-LaRoche or
104 See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 370
(1983); 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1981); California Computer
Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979).
At one time, U.S. courts looked with suspicion on all acts of aggressive competition by
a firm with a monopoly or near monopoly share. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). This is no longer the case. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); In re
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
1 21,770 (1980) (titanium dioxide); cases cited in the paragraph above.
105 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 105 S. Ct. 1163 (1985).
106 Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 3370 (1983); 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1981). See also
Ordover & Willig, supra note 86, at 9-15.
In 0. Hommel, the leading firm gave secret, selective price reductions to three of its
major customers. In doing so it priced below its average cost. 659 F.2d at 342. There was
no showing that the seller intended to or would drive competitors out of busienss, gain
monopoly power, and raise prices. Id. at 354. The court found no violation. The court
decided the case under the Robinson-Patman Act. It construed the Act to serve the broader
purposes of the Sherman Act. Id. at 346.
A dominant firm can monopolize by, for example, a plan of geographic price discrimination whereby the firm lowers its price below cost whenever a new entrant attempts to
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Michelin.)
2. The acts are or amount to unreasonably exclusionary exclusive dealing. Thus, in the case of loyalty discounts, the practice
must have the effect of inducing exclusive or nearly exclusive
dealing. In any case, barriers to entry must be significant and
the arrangements must foreclose access to outlets necessary to
support a 1 07sufficient number of productively efficient
competitors.
On the other hand, U.S. courts would not condemn discounts
as monopolistic simply because they exert "irresistible" pressure
(to accept a good deal) and thus induce the customer to buy its
incremental needs from the dominant firm. A seller's sustained
lower prices are an irresistible incentive to buy from that seller; yet
08
sustained low prices are procompetitive.
Hoffmann-La Roche' 0 9 presents the possible example of a strategy that may have unreasonably excluded competitors and lessened
competition in the sense proscribed by American law, although the
Court never explored the facts necessary to draw this conclusion.
The vitamin company's exclusive or near exclusive dealing through
rebates and other more explicit arrangements may have tied so
much of the existing and incremental demand to Roche as to
squeeze out competitors from an already concentrated market.
The fact that all significant buyers probably needed at least some
vitamin B 6 from Roche (which accounted for more than 80% of this
market), and the fact that the discounts were cumulatively available
on the basis of all vitamins bought from Roche would aggravate the
negative effects. Roche might thus have used its market power in
enter or expand in a new geographic market. See In re Borden, Inc., [1976-1979 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,490 (1978), aff'd, 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded on request of FTC, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,383 (Sup. Ct. 1983). See
44 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 521 (Mar. 3, 1983) for the FTC's modification

of the order. Also, a monopolist may violate section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act when it uses its monopoly power in one market to discriminate against its competitors
in another market. La Peyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966). See also Official Airline
Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981) (no
violation where the monopolist is not a competitor of the complainant).
107

See In re Beltone Electronics Corp., [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.

(CCH) 21,934 (1982) (upholding exclusive dealing contracts by the largest hearing aid
manufacturer where the arrangement was important to wage effective competition).
108 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elect. Indus., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other gronnds, 106 S. Ct.

1348 (1986), wherein the district court stated:
[I]t is plainly in the interest of a purchaser to obtain a rebate so as to get the lowest
possible price. Although plaintiffs decry the activities of Sears in securing rebates
from Sanyo and Toshiba.... it appears to be procompetitive and in Sears' interest
for Sears, or any buyer, to get the best price it can.
513 F. Supp. at 1251 (footnote omitted).
109

1979 E.C.R. 461, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
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vitamin B 6 both to expand its position in that market and to consolidate its position in the market for other vitamins.
The above analysis makes numerous assumptions, however. If
the question is whether the rebate scheme increased Roche's market power, one would wish to know more about the competitive
structure of the various vitamin markets, the percentage of the markets and the percentage of incremental demand effectively foreclosed by Roche's practices, the size necessary for a producer to
achieve efficient scale, and whether entry involved significant unrecoupable costs. One would also wish to explore other conditions
of and facts about entry, including the likelihood that the big buyers
would integrate backwards if Roche charged higher prices. 110
Similar questions are likewise unexplored in Michelin,II where
the Court ofJustice stressed the competitors' right to access to the
market and the dealers' right of freedom of choice and
independence.
There may be a middle ground in which the dominant firm's
act does not hurt competition in the sense of raising price but
neither does the enforcement raise price. The loyalty discount
schemes may increase the ability of dominant sellers to exploit their
existing market power and to expand their market share at the expense of competitors, without reducing costs. 1 2 A ban against
such strategies might encourage general rather than selective lower
prices. The Roche and Michelin strategies could then be seen more
clearly as exploitative offenses illegal under article 86, particularly
in view of the objective of the Community to preserve opportunities
for small and middle-sized firms to compete on the merits.
VIII.

Technological Progress-The IBM Example

A major issue for the next decade involves the extent to which
110 If, for example, Roche's prices for all vitamins were tightly constrained by the buyers, Roche's strategies were not a means to get excess profits (although they undoubtedly
were a means to take extra market share from competitors).
The competitors would have had a fair chance to compete if (1) Roche's competitors
were equally efficient with Roche at existing scale and there were no significant additional
efficiencies to be achieved by greater scale, or (2) if Roche's practices did not deprive the
competitors of sufficient outlets for them to realize available efficiencies. Then, if Roche
was not selling below its costs, Roche's average price to a customer that bought only from it
would be no less than a competitive price. The higher price at the outset, before discounts,
would return more than a competitive profit. By charging only a competitive price, the
competitors could have won the business at the outset.
111 1983 E.C.R. 3461, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
14,031.
112 Fidelity rebates, like exclusive dealing contracts, reduce transaction costs because
the firm does not have to compete for future sales to the customer. But this is a cost-saving
device only in the sense that monopolies save costs-it eliminates the costs of competition.
Under a system that chooses competition over monopoly, it would be inappropriate to
count these costs as a waste.
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antitrust obligations will be imposed upon dominant, technologically advanced firms that stand astride several functionally related
markets and whose strategies promise both to advance the state of
the art and to derail competitors who are dependent upon compatibility.11 3 No case involving these problems has yet come before the
Court ofJustice.11 4 The importance of the issue, however, warrants
113 See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 370 (1983); California Computer Prods. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.
1979); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980). See Sullivan, Monopolization: Corporate Strategy, the IBM Cases, and the
Transformation of the Law, 60 TEx. L. REV. 587 (1982).
114 Two recent cases, however, deserve mention. One is a Court of Justice judgment
involving rather clear-cut anticompetitive conduct; the other is a case expected to come
before the Court of Justice involving predatory pricing strategies.
In the latter case, Akzo Chemie, Akzo Chemie and Engineering & Chemical Supplies
(ECS) both manufactured benzoyl peroxide, which is a raw material used in flour milling
and also in plastics. ECS established its position as supplier to flour millers. When it found
itself with excess capacity it decided to sell also to plastics manufacturers, who were largely
supplied by Akzo. When Akzo learned of ECS's intentions, it began a campaign to attack
ECS in the smaller (milling) market segment. It gave ECS an ultimatum to drop its plans
within the week or to expect to be put out of business. When ECS did not change course,
Akzo sold ECS's milling customers at selectively low prices, to pressure ECS to leave its
(Akzo's) plastics customers alone. Akzo's prices were not below its variable costs. The
Commission viewed Akzo's conduct as a predatory campaign, and levied a heavy fine on
Akzo. 374 O.J.L. 1 (Dec. 31, 1985). See 50 ANrITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 32
(Jan. 2, 1986).
The Court of Justice judgment is Italian Republic v. Commission, 1985 E.C.R. -,
[1983-985 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 14,168, which concerns anticompetitive rulemaking by British Telecommunications (BT), a nationalized firm having a statutory monopoly of the management of telecommunication systems in the United Kingdom.
A lucrative part of BT's business was retransmitting international messages which passed
through Great Britain but neither originated nor terminated there. Seizing the profit opportunity, reforwarding agencies developed. These private agencies used new computer
technology which allowed the receipt and rapid forwarding of a large volume of messages.
The private agencies charged prices much lower than BT. BT responded by issuing rules
prohibiting private message reforwarding in international telecommunications.
The case principally concerned the applicability of article 86 in view of BT's status as a
lawful government monopoly and in view of obligations under the International Telecommunications Convention (article 86 was held applicable). The case also concerned the propriety under article 86 of BT's reserving ancillary activities to itself.
Students of the U.S. antitrust laws will recognize BT's arguments on the merits as falling within the familiar free-rider claim. BT argued that the private agencies were making
abnormal use of the lines carrying the heaviest traffic, thus threatening to degrade BT's
facilities. It also asserted that the agencies' activities helped third parties to evade the full
charge for the complete route. (The latter claim was just another way of saying that the
competition from the private agencies siphoned off lucrative business.)
Examining the competitive effect of the rules, the Court ofJustice first noted the technological advances utilized by the private agencies, and thus the consumer benefits they
provided. The Court then proceeded to give short shrift to BT's justifications. The judgment reads in terms of failure of proof: Plaintiff "totally failed to demonstrate" that the
activities of the private agencies-which may have attracted more international business on
routes through the United Kingdom-"were, taken as a whole, unfavorable to BT, or that
[invalidation of BT's rules] put the performance of the particular tasks entrusted to BT in
jeopardy from the economic point of view." [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
14,168, at 16,019. The judgment implies that the Court was unsympathetic
REP. (CCH)
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a brief look at the EEC proceedings against IBM.' 1 5
IBM is a large multinational company which has substantial
production facilities in the European Community (as well as in the
United States and elsewhere) and holds a dominant share of all
sales of large computers in the Community. IBM's major architectural system, at least for purposes of the Common Market litigation,
is System 370. IBM makes software usable in System 370, and it
makes peripheral attachments to the mainframe (or central processing unit (CPU)) such as memories and disks. As a maker of
software and peripheral attachments, IBM is in competition with a
number of other firms, which also make products specially for attachment to System 370.
IBM "bundled" its software with its hardware; that is, it sold
them in one package at one price. Also, IBM periodically improved
the technological design of the CPU, causing changes in the interface between the mainframe and the peripheral equipment
designed to be plugged into it. IBM announced these improved
products and took orders for them often a year before they would
be available. The peripheral competitors, however, even when fully
capable of making similar improvements, could not give a firm delivery date for their improved product until after IBM shipped the
preannounced IBM units to its customers, for only then did IBM
make available the configuration of the new interface and thus only
then could the peripheral competitors complete the other side of
6
the interface.'
In 1980, the Commission filed a Statement of Objections
charging IBM with an abuse of a dominant position. It characterized as abuses bundling, changing interfaces and announcing new
products to customers without timely disclosure of the new interfaces, and certain other practices that IBM abandoned. The Commission maintained that IBM's commercial strategy did not derive
exclusively from the merits of its product and that the strategy unreasonably excluded competitors in the manufacture of software
to the alleged justifications (as it should have been, particularly since BT accepted the Commission's censure, the United Kingdom did not appeal, and the latter task fell to the Government of Italy, which wanted to protect the power of state). One suspects, however, that
even had the UK appealed, the plaintiff would have had a heavy burden of proof on justifications.
The case is fully compatible with substantive U.S. monopoly law, and is somewhat reminiscent of MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 234 (1983) and Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S.
366 (1973).
115 The author consulted with the EC Commission on certain jurisdictional matters relating to the IBM case.
116 See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY § 6, points 94-95 (1985); IBM Settles Antitrust Suit with Common Market; Rivals
Welcome Concessions, but Hopedfor More, Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1984, at 2, col. 2.
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and peripheral attachments from opportunities to meet consumer
demand, to the detriment of competitors, buyers, and users of IBM
17
computers in the Community. No "bad" intent was alleged.'
The case was suspended in August 1984 upon IBM's acceptance of a unilateral undertaking to modify its business practices.
IBM agreed not to bundle its main memory with its CPUs and to
disclose interface information necessary to attach peripherals to its
CPUs. It also agreed to disclose this information to makers of IBMcompatible peripherals and to customers, upon request, within 120
days after announcement of a new product or the date of general
availability, whichever was earlier. It retained the right to charge a
reasonable, nondiscriminatory fee and the right to withhold product design information. IBM also agreed to make timely disclosure
to competing makers of systems and networks in order to enable
them to interconnect their systems with IBM's System 370.'118
The Commission described the expected effect of IBM's agreement as follows:
The undertaking will have the effect of substantially improving
the position of both users and competitors in the markets for
System 370 products in the EEC. As a result, competition in the
Common Market can be expected to be strengthened and made
more effective. Users will now be given the possibility of a
choice between different suppliers at an earlier time. They may
also be free to choose from a wider selection of products because other manufacturers will now have the incentive to develop new products in the knowledge that the essential interface
information will be made available.' 19
While the Common Market proceeding against IBM presented
a serious issue of abuse of dominance, 20 in the United States pri12
vate plaintiffs suing IBM for equivalent conduct fared badly. '
Moreover, in 1982, the U.S. Department of Justice withdrew its
fourteen-year-old suit against IBM because the Assistant Attorney
117 See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 116.
118 [1982-1984 New Developments] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
10,608 (1984). See
also COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 116, § 6, point 95. IBM's un-

dertaking is set forth in full at [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8708.
119 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITES, supra note 116, § 6, point 95. The
Wall Streetjournal, however, saw the Commission's victory as symbolic only. See IBM Setties Antitrust Suit with Common Market, supra note 116.

120 See, e.g., ICI & Commerical Solvents Corp. v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 223, [1974
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8209; United Brands v. Commission, 1978
E.C.R. 207, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429.
121

IBM won the private U.S. cases that went to trial (e.g., Transamerica and Cakomp, supra

note 113), and settled the cases that were apparently more difficult. See, e.g., Greyhound
Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040
(1978); Control Data Corp. v. IBM Corp., 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,363 (D. Minn.
1973).
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General in charge of the Antitrust Division believed that the case
was substantially without merit and that a victory for the government would chill innovation by IBM and other technologically pro22
gressive firms. 1
I focus here on technology aspects of the case and consider
choices for antitrust policy where the only admissible policy concerns are efficiency and progressiveness. 123 Comparing Common
Market enforcement policy and U.S. enforcement policy, I suggest
that the superior wisdom of one approach over the other is not apparent. More freedom of the dominant firm implies less price competition in general, and less technological development by smaller
firms; more access by competitors to interface information implies
less technological development by the dominant firm. It is not easy
to'predict, and it may not be possible to predict, which emphasis
has stronger efficiency and progressiveness properties.
Policy choices may be seen as follows:
Efficiency and Progressiveness

1

2

A

B

Freedom of the dominant firm
to choose strategy and not to
disclose

Freedom of the dominant
firm, unless plaintiff proves
that the dominant firm's strategy imposes costs on competitors in order to increase its
dominance

Access of competitors to information necessary to make
product compatible, unless the
dominant firm proves that a
duty to provide the information will unduly interfere with
incentives to invent and will
therefore harm consumers

Access of competitors to information necessary for compatibility

122 See Recent Actions of the Department ofJustice in United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.
and United States v. International Business Machines Corp., Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1982) (statement of William F. Baxter).
123 "Fairness" is a proper policy concern. I have eliminated the concern here for reasons of simplicity. If I were to treat fairness I would want to recognize different notions of
fairness. Common Market law generally sees the fairness concern as the right of the smaller
competitor to access. Dominant firms assert, to the contrary, that fairness lies on their side
because smaller firms copy the dominant firm's products and capitalize on opportunities in
a market that the latter has created.
In general, to the extent that a legal principle is established (e.g., smaller firms have
rights of access, or dominant firms have rights of exploitation), a fairness concern exists in
support of the established right; it is fair to follow the established rules of the game.
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If a system follows the principle of Grid IA, the functionally
integrated dominant firm whose competitors are dependent upon
compatibility will have maximum incentives to invest in whatever
technology it decides buyers want, and also in whatever product
changes will suppress the efforts of competitors, as long as the expected payback is more than the costs. 124 Under this regime, the
dominant firm is likely to produce more technological change, and
the changes are more likely to be impervious to competitor penetration. 12 5 The net increase (or decrease) in efficiency and progressiveness will be the technological advances by the dominant firm,
less the sum of the contribution in technology and lower price that
would otherwise have been made by the competitors, the amount
spent by the dominant firm on setting back its competitors, and the
amount spent by the competitors in "reinventing the wheel" to figure out the new interface configurations.
If a system follows the principle of Grid 2B, the competitors
will have maximum incentives both to copy and to invent, and their
more immediate competition with the dominant firm will tend to
push down price. If the required disclosures necessarily reveal
trade secrets (thus, more information than the dimensions and configurations of a plug), then the competitors will have the incentive
to free ride on the investment of the dominant firm and the dominant firm is likely to make a lower level of investment in technology.
The net increase (or decrease) in efficiency and progressiveness will
be the technological contributions, lower price and higher output
brought about by the competition of the competitors, less the
"lost" technological contributions by the dominant firm.
Grids lB and 2A are intermediate choices. Grid 1B leans towards freedom of discretion by the dominant firm while Grid 2A
leans towards incentives for the challengers. The reader will recognize Grid lB as a description, more or less, of the state of the U.S.
law of monopolization. 2 6 Grid 2A may be said to reflect the com124 Predicted success of predatory strategies may depend on beliefs regarding how
quickly the market works to discipline exploitative and exclusionary behavior. Compare Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1983) and Easterbrook, supra note 9 (the market works faster than government intervention to cure market
failures; predation seldom promises a pay-back, therefore it cannot be expected to exist)
with Sullivan, supra note 113 (setting forth some of plaintiff's evidence of predation in the
U.S. Government case against IBM) and Strategy, Predation,andAntitrust Analysis (S. Salop ed.
FTC 1981). See Thomas, Antitrust and the Issue of Competitive Advantage: EconomicAnalysis and
United States v. IBM, 1985 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 165.
125 If, of course, barriers to the creation of another system of architecture are surmountable, one would expect competitors to introduce new systems and not subject themselves to
the foreseeable obstacles of compatibility.
126 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 105 S. Ct. 2874 (1985); Barry
Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983); Transamerica Computer
Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 370 (1983); California
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promise between IBM and the EEC Commission.
Economic learning does not dictate the "right" choice among
options.1 27 Given our inability to predict what dynamic losses and
gains will result from any one of the options, the choice is a value
judgment. This is particularly so if some product design information is inextricably intertwined with the interface information.128
The Treaty of Rome's concern for small and middle-sized enterprises and its prescription for regulating discretionary private
power are compatible with the choice, made by the Commission, to
rein in the dominant firm.
IX. Conclusion
Community law against abuse of a dominant position regulates
excessive pricing, proscribes acquisitions that increase dominance,
and forbids strategies that unnecessarily exclude competitors from
markets, deprive entrepreneurs of access to inputs, and deprive
buyers of freedom of choice.' 29 United States law against monopolization and attempts to monopolize proscribes acquisition or entrenchment of monopoly by acts not based on competitive merits,
which may include monopolistic mergers and unreasonably exclusionary strategies.' 3 0
United States law is increasingly sensitive to the prospect that
some business strategies that tend to increase the market share of
even a dominant firm may be more helpful than hurtful to consumers,' 3 ' and some influential policymakers and scholars argue that
the consumer is best protected by respect for the freedom of action
Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979); Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
In Transamerica, the plaintiff proved at least one instance in which IBM changed an
interface only because the existing interface made it too easy for the peripheral competitors
to attach their equipment to the IBM CPU, and at least one other instance in which IBM
changed an interface with the predominant intent of precluding or delaying competition by
peripheral competitors (the Apricot and Mallard incidents). But even these incidents were
not enough to persuade the court to impose liability. The court was swayed, instead, by the
fact that the interfaces adopted were virtually always accompanied by credible claims that
they improved the state of the art. 481 F. Supp. 965, 1002-05 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 698
F.2d 1373 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 370 (1983).
127 Regarding antitrust and technology, see Scherer, On the Current State of Knowledge in
IndustrialOrganization, in MAINSTREAMS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (University of Amsterdam, Aug. 22, 1985) (in publication, de Jong and Shepherd eds.).
128 If on the other hand the interface information is discrete, and giving interface information is equivalent to describing only the protrusions and dimensions of a plug and
socket, it is likely that efficiency and progressiveness will be enhanced by a duty to provide
the information to manufacturers of the plug compatible equipment. Whether interface
information necessarily conveys product design information was a question of fact in the
IBM cases.
129 See generally text accompanying notes 62-89 supra.
130 Id
131 See note 113 supra.
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of the private firm. 132 Community law, by contrast, seems to draw
virtually conclusive presumptions that dominant firm conduct with
exclusionary tendencies is against the consumer interest.' 33 Moreover, in the Community, the sentiment that freedom of private action will nearly always protect the public interest finds relatively few
34
sympathetic ears. 1
The two systems of law might provide substantial lessons for
one another. Within the framework of article 86, for example, a
dominant firm might be permitted to justify conduct that would
otherwise amount to a prohibited exploitation but does not increase market power by showing that the conduct reduced its
costs,' 3 5 or that it increased its product quality or was otherwise
36
procompetitive.1
The Commercial Solvents case presents a framework for analysis.
Commercial Solvents vertically integrated into the production of
drugs for treatment of tuberculosis, and upon integration it no
longer offered to Zoja the scarce raw material needed in the pro132 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 15; Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment
of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. Ci. L. REV. 6, 23 (1981). See also the opinion

ofJustice Posner in Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tele. Co., 1986-1 Trade
Cas. 67,189 (7th Cir. 1986).
133 See, e.g., N.V. Wederlandsche Baden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R.
3461, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH)
14,031; Hoffman-La
Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKr. REP.
(CCH) $ 8527; United Brands v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429; ICI & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 223, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKr. REP. (CCH) T 8209.
134

See

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETI-

11, 14 (1982) (Community competition policy "is not based on the laissez-faire
model"; and describing attempts "to strengthen the position of small and medium-sized
undertakings."). For a comparison of a Common Market conception of "economic reality"
and an American conception of "economic reality," see Fox, supra note 27.
135 I would not include in this definition of "costs": (1) the costs of competition (e.g.,
the transaction costs of competing for the business saved by tie-ins), or (2) cost savings that
could be achieved only by imposing equivalent or higher costs on competitors (e.g., a dominant firm's reduction of costs through larger scale that could be achieved only by depriving
competitors of sales necessary to reach efficient scale). In the latter category, an exception
could be made in the case of a truly contestable market, if one exists, where larger scale
reduces costs and, by hypothesis, competitive pressures push price down to costs.
In this middle ground of prohibited exploitative restraints there are certain efficiency
trade-offs. Certain price discrimination may be banned even though it may lead to increased output and increased aggregate wealth. Certain tying and exclusive dealing may be
banned even though it saves the seller's transaction costs, and even though the tying may
be a form of price discrimination that increases output and total wealth. Moreover, a ban
against refusals to deal that are a by-product of vertical integration may induce firms to
enter the market fully integrated, thus blocking opportunities for the growth of firms such
as Zoja.
136 This is essentially the principle I have proposed for U.S. law. See Fox, supra note 3, at
1183. I suggest modification of existing principles of law that are derived from
noneconomic values embedded in the law, upon proof by the proponent of change that on
balance the principle harms consumers. Id. at 1179-85.
TION POLICY
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cess. Let us assume, for purposes of this example, that the integration did not raise barriers to entry. The integration did not cause
limitation of output or increased price to consumers because one
firm was simply substituted for another. 37 Since the Community
has a strong principle against cutoffs of traditional customers, Commercial Solvents is put to its proof that the vertical integration will
reduce its costs, that continued supply to Zoja would increase its
cost savings from the
costs, and, perhaps, that a fair share of the 38
consumers.
to
on
passed
be
will
integration
If Commercial Solvents cannot meet its burden, it might be inferred that the purpose of the integration and cutoff was to better
exploit its monopoly power in the raw material. In that case the
only point at issue would be the division of supracompetitive profits
between Commercial Solvents and Zoja. The antitrust enforcement
would not cause competitive harm, and recognition of a duty to
deal would legitimate a fairness and access principle important to
the Community.
In a second situation, Hoffmann-La Roche executed exclusive
dealing contracts with the largest buyers of vitamins, whose
purchases comprised most purchases of vitamins. I assume for purposes of this example that the larger market share assured by the
contracts did not give Roche increased power over price because
the larger buyers would integrate if Roche raised its price. Since
the Community has a strong principle in favor of preserving the
ability of small and middle-sized producers to compete for these
purchases, Roche is put to its proof that the contracts save costs,
137 If Commercial Solvents' vertical integration saved it costs in an amount that exceeded the dislocation losses to Zoja and did not make consumers worse off, the integration
would have increased "economic welfare" in the sense that that phrase is often used in the
literature on antitrust economics. That is, society would be using fewer of its resources for
the same output, making society, in the aggregate, wealthier.
138 The U.S. antitrust thinkers who advocate minimal use of antitrust generally propose
that the law should not reprehend transactions that enhance economic welfare even if only
the producer realizes all of the efficiency gain; that is, even if no cost saving is passed on to
consumers of the relevant product. It is said that we are all consumers of a multitude of
products and that we are all better off if producers save money which they can then invest in
other productive activity that (by definition) people desire. Thus, "consumer welfare" is
frequently used to mean aggregate economic welfare. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); Interview with
William F. Baxter, 50 ANTITRUST LJ. 151 (1981). This word usage obscures the possibility

that producers of the product in question gain, consumers of that product lose, and consumers at large do not proportionately gain.
Community law, however, is concerned with consumer well-being in relation to the
relevant product and would ordinarily not allow an increase in producer welfare to trump
consumer benefit. Article 85(3) explicitly looks in this direction, for it allows ajustification
for combinations that distort competition only when a fair share of the benefits are passed
on to consumers. Article 86 could incorporate the concept ofArticle 85(3)-a showing that
a fair share of benefits are passed on to consumers-in a justification defense for otherwise
exploitative conduct.
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other than the cost of competing for the sales. If Roche does not
meet this burden, the exploitative act is prohibited. If Roche cannot meet this burden, it might be inferred that Roche's objective
was simply to gain more market share, even without the promise of
a higher profit rate in the near term.
If the Community should embrace this mode of analysis, Common Market developments might provide helpful insights for U.S.
antitrust policy.' 3 9 If defendants in Community forums consistently
fail to satisfy their burden of proof that acts of a certain kind, such
as cutoffs or loyalty rebates, are justified by cost-savings or preservation of the integrity of a system, this evidence will tend to disprove the hypothesis that acts that do not increase market power
are efficient. Conversely, if defendants consistently satisfy their
burden of proof as to acts of a certain kind, such as the selective
service-and-repair system of Hugin in marketing its cash registers,
the evidence will tend to confirm the efficiency hypothesis for acts
of the genre.
Thus, article 86 jurisprudence may contribute to U.S. law in
the middle ground where antitrust enforcement is not necessary to
keep the consumer from facing a higher price for known goods but
is important to protect other public interests in a competitive
system.

139 Community law might provide particular guidance in the perplexed area where the
plaintiff cannot prove that the challenged acts increase a dominant firm's market power, but
principles of U.S. antitrust law-based on non-efficiency values now coming into question-provide for a cause of action.
A number of these U.S. cases involve claims that defendant's acts foreclosed competitors from the chance to compete for significant segments of the market. See, e.g., Ford
Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380
U.S. 592 (1965); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1965);
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
Other U.S. cases not involving output restriction concern boycotts and other forms of
coercion. For an example of the latter, see FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 106 S.
Ct. 2009 (1986) (dentists agreed to refuse to give x-rays to insurers); Paramount Famous
Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930) (film producer-distributors agreed to refuse to deal with exhibitors unless they signed a standard form contract requiring arbitration of disputes; their agreement offended the Sherman Act). For a statement of how
output theory (i.e., no government intervention unless the activity restricts output) could

apply to a concerted secondary boycott by "traditional" orthopaedic surgeons against discounting orthopaedic surgeons, see the opinion of Judge Posner in Marrese v. American
Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 1982), vacated and replaced, 706
F.2d 1488 (7th Cir. 1983).

